Summary of Lecture delivered by Prof. Uzy Rabi, Chairman of Moshe Dayan Institute for African and Middle Eastern Studies , the Tel-Aviv University delivered at the 10th Anniversary Memorial Evening to Hagay Shefi, on September 22, 2011, at the Israel Bar

Al-Qaida and Radical Islam in the Middle East

 

The terror attacks of September 11, 2001, can be seen as an unprecedented historical event in many ways.

First and foremost, Al-Qaida managed to inflict a real blow on the West, by destroying the place that represented the true ‘essence’ of the West in the eyes of Al-Qaida: the Twin Towers, towering into the sky, the heart of the West’s economic activity.

On the other hand, the event reflected the ongoing disappointment and frustration of the extremists with the political and social situation in the Middle East and beyond – and with their powerlessness to change that situation.

Al-Qaida has long seen the multi-state system of the Middle East as a byproduct of western conspiracy, which came into being in the aftermath of World War I, in accordance with the Sykes-Picot agreement. In fact, the West created a divide-and-rule situation: the Islamic world became a bunch of territorial states, according to western design. The kings and presidents of Arab and Muslim states were installed by the West, in order to respond to western orders. Al-Qaida considers many of the rulers in these states as ‘western agents’, and seeks to topple them.
From the events of 9/11, we can conclude that Al-Qaida was thus far unsuccessful in changing this situation. When it realized it could not change the realities of the Middle East, it shifted its emphasis to a different front: that of the civilizations. Al-Qaida anticipated that a dramatic attack like 9/11 would raise the tension between Islamic and western civilization. Its reasoning was that the best way to hit the western agents that are ruling Muslim states is to stir up the clash between civilizations and animosity between the two worlds – and hence, between the West and its ‘agents’. Al-Qaida’s worldview argues that by defeating the far enemy (U.S.) first, the near enemy – Israel and “illegitimate” Middle Eastern leaders, such as the Saudis and the other monarchies, can be defeated more easily. 
To some extent, Al-Qaida managed to achieve its aims, since the West and Islam were at real loggerheads in the aftermath of 9/11. This caused friction between America and some of its allies in the Middle East, mostly Saudi Arabia and others.

Al-Qaida does not recognize nation-states, and is a transnational movement. Therefore it chooses to act from no-man’s-lands (such as Afghanistan and Iraq
and now Somalia and Yemen). These failed states became a haven for Al-Qaida because it is the perfect place to resist Western influence; and this is the essence of Al-Qaida.

By the way, al-Qaida was born in an Afghanistan under foreign occupation: not when the US was there, but when the Soviets were there. It is always the same story: the outsider is coming in to demolish the Islamic civilization, and this is al-Qaida’s main battle. This logic will always be the same: it is not about a conflict between states (which are a western invention anyway), but between civilizations.

Many commentators thought that Al-Qaida would lose its relevance in the second decade of the 21st century. The liquidation of bin Laden and the Arab Spring caused the impression that Al-Qaida would soon become obsolete. Even Salman Rushdie thought that this would be the beginning of the end of Al-Qaida and other similar movements.
Those who followed this rationale were right in a way. Indeed, we saw in the Arab Spring that the public is moving the whole thing: no need for al-Qaida and violence. The Arab Spring shows that rulers can be toppled without using the violent means, that al-Qaida espoused. The public at large can create a situation where civil society is pushing ahead for a more democratic system and open up the political participation issues.
The problem with this argument is that we don’t know what we will end up with. In the post-revolutionary phase, it is likely that the most dogmatic or organized forces will come to the fore in these states. Parties such as the Muslim Brothers, or other Islamic parties, can capitalize on the political turmoil in these states.

Al-Qaida interprets the instability and toppling of dictators as something in line with its own vision.
Al-Qaida has become more of a political and religious ideology than an organized entity. It consists of activists that hold an eschatological view: that time works in their favor. They believe in "Sabr Taarihi": historical patience. If time is on your side, you can always think that in the end you will prevail. If dictators are toppled now, it means we are on the right path.

All in all, since al-Qaida is a concept, since it is a movement that was born as a result of the ongoing friction between Islam and the West, it would be safe to assume that as long as there are such frictions, there is a raison d’être for the existence of al-Qaida.

So the main question is not whether al-Qaida is gone or not. It is not an either/or situation. The main question to ask is how the free world could create a situation where that movement will be marginalized. This can be achieved only by a full-scale political, intelligence, and military effort.